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Abstract:
This paper examines the employment effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by using 
matched establishment-level data from Finland. Our data register practically almost all M&As in all 
sectors. We compare the employment effects of cross-border M&As with the effects arising from 
two different types of domestic M&As and internal restructurings. The results show that cross-
border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing employment. The effects of cross-border M&As 
on employment in non-manufacturing are much weaker. Changes in ownership associated with 
domestic M&As and internal restructurings also typically cause employment losses, but they exhibit 
an interesting sectoral variation.
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1. Introduction
This paper uses matching methods to evaluate the employment effects of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). M&As are a key device to enlarge a purchasing firm in all developed countries. For 
instance, in Finland, hardly any significant restructuring of any industry has been carried out 
without ownership changes. The volume of cross-border M&As has increased at a rapid pace 
recently (Rossi and Volpin 2004), inspiring a lot of debate in Europe. In general, the attitude 
towards M&As has been rather positive because they restructure the economy, but cross-border 
M&As have been seen, as a threat to employment, especially in public debate. 
Systematic micro-level evidence on the causal effect of M&As on employment is quite sparse 
despite the importance of the topic. The literature has mostly studied the effects of foreign 
acquisitions on productivity and wages (e.g. Bellak 2004). This paper contributes by analysing the 
employment effects of M&As on target firms by using matched establishment-level data from 
Finland. In this paper, we do not focus solely on cross-border or domestic M&As; rather we analyse 
the employment effects of several different types of M&As. We classify M&As as being either a 
cross-border M&A (in which the purchaser is a foreign company that is located abroad), a domestic 
M&A with a domestically-owned purchaser, a domestic M&A with a foreign-owned company that 
is located in Finland, or an internal restructuring in which the purchaser is not another company. 
The Finnish case has a broader interest. Since Finland is a small open country, the enlargement of 
foreign ownership can have a more profound effect on employment in Finland than in large 
countries. The issue has been a subject of public debate recently because cross-border M&As have 
greatly increased in number following the removal of restrictions over foreign ownership during the 
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early 1990s. After establishing a Finnish affiliate, foreign firms have typically continued to enlarge 
through domestic M&As, especially in many service industries such as transport. 
This paper deviates from the earlier ones regarding the data coverage, the definition of M&As, and 
the methods. Earlier research was focused on manufacturing, but its share has declined in developed 
countries. Our data also include services. The dynamics of employment may be different in non-
manufacturing because services are less capital-intensive than manufacturing. It may well be that 
conclusions obtained earlier at least partly reflect their focus on the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, our data register practically almost all M&As, not only major M&As. 
We use information on the actual events of different types of M&As to establish our definitions.1
The interference of foreign firms and foreign ownership is then more accurately specified than in 
the studies that consider a registered change from domestic to foreign majority ownership. Most of 
the earlier papers (e.g. Conyon et al. 2002a, Gugler and Yurtoglu 2004) have relied on parametric 
methods. We use non-parametric, matching methods instead. Our data enable us to ensure that the 
control group to whom the establishments, which have been targets of different types of M&As, are 
compared with include only those establishments that have not been involved in any kind of M&As. 
This allows us to isolate the pure effects of different types of M&As. 
In this paper, we discover that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing 
employment. The effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-manufacturing are much 
weaker. Domestic M&As with a domestic purchaser, instead, have negative employment effects for 
all sectors. The impact of domestic M&As with foreign-owned purchasers is remarkably negative in 
construction and other services. In addition, internal restructurings have substantial negative 
                                                          
1 Our data do not permit us to separate friendly and hostile takeovers from each other, which has been possible in some 
other papers (e.g. Conyon et al. 2001).
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employment effects in trade (including hotels and restaurants). Taken together, our most important 
finding is that almost all changes in ownership lead to employment losses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarises the empirical literature, Section 3 discusses 
the theoretical arguments, Section 4 contains a description of our data, Section 5 describes the 
empirical framework, and Section 6 reports our results and the last section concludes.
2. Relevant empirical literature
Brown and Medoff (1988), Bhagat et al. (1990), and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report the 
negative effects of M&As on employment in the USA. In contrast, McGuckin et al. (1995), 
McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), and Ollinger et al. (2005) discover some positive effects. Part of the 
evidence is based on very restricted samples of companies covering narrow segments of the US 
economy. For instance, Brown and Medoff use a sample of companies located in the state of 
Michigan.
The studies from Europe also report mixed findings. Conyon et al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b) discover 
the negative effects of M&As on employment in the UK by using data on 277 listed companies. The 
negative effects are particularly pronounced for hostile transactions. Girma and Görg (2004) find, 
by using data from the UK electronics industry, that the incidence of foreign takeover reduces 
employment growth, in particular for unskilled labour. Girma (2005) uncovers detrimental 
employment effects amongst larger foreign takeover targets in the UK, but beneficial impacts 
amongst smaller ones. Amess and Wright (2007) observe that management buyouts increase 
employment in the UK. Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) discover by using Italian firm-level data that, 
compared with firms that were not subject to any ownership change, companies targeted by foreign 
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investors marked an increase in the employment level a few years after the acquisition.2 Bellak et al. 
(2006) find that foreign takeovers have no causal effect on employment growth among Austrian 
manufacturing firms. Margolis (2006) reports the negative employment effects of M&As from 
France, albeit only in the short term.   
For Sweden, which has a small open economy much like Finland’s, Siegel and Simons (2006) 
report for manufacturing firms that M&As lead to the downsizing of employment. Their linked 
employer-employee data do not include cross-border M&As separately. Hence, they are not able to 
compare the employment effects of different types of M&As (cross-border M&As vs. domestic 
M&As). Furthermore, Siegel et al. (2008) find that employment is reduced after ownership change 
by using data on Swedish manufacturing plants.
Gugler and Yurtoglu study the effect of M&As on employment in Europe and the USA and do not 
find any adverse effects of M&As on labour demand in the USA. However, for Europe the negative 
employment effect emerges. In particular, they report that European mergers reduce the demand for 
labour by about 10% on average, attributing this to more rigid labour markets in Europe. For that 
reason, firms are forced to use M&As in Europe as a restructuring device.  
There are earlier studies on the effects of foreign acquisitions using Finnish data. All these papers 
have used data covering the manufacturing sector. They consider either productivity effects 
(Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 2004) or wage and education effects (Huttunen 2007). In particular, 
                                                          
2 Gong et al. (2007) also discover that foreign acquisitions cause higher employment growth by using a sample of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises. 
Page 6 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
6
Huttunen shows that the share of highly educated workers declines, although slightly and slowly, 
after the ownership has changed from domestic to foreign in the acquired plants.3
3. Theoretical considerations
Recognizing the motives for M&As helps us to understand how M&As influence employment. The 
most important motives of M&As (e.g. Mueller 2003) are to
1) obtain genuine synergy gains (Farrell and Shapiro 1990),
2) utilize scales economies in various forms,
3) strengthen the market power in pricing,
4) revise the implicit agreements related to the firm’s personnel and other stakeholders, and 
5) promote the managers’ own deviating interests.
An M&A creates synergy gains when the more efficient practices are extended to comprise the 
whole enlarged firm. In horizontal M&As the marginal costs of production in an inefficient firm 
typically decrease to the level that prevails in the more efficient party. Vertical M&As may 
intensify incentives to exert effort (Lehto 2006). Synergy-promoting M&As aim to increase 
productivity, perhaps also supporting employment. By raising efficiency, the parties of M&As 
become more competitive, which may help them to take over the market from their competitors. 
It is not, however, evident that M&As, in general, tend only to internalize the benefits of genuine 
synergy gains. It is plausible that the parties of M&As often aim to use their assets jointly 
(including human capital) to obtain scale economies. Sharing assets is motivated by the cost 
                                                          
3 Furthermore, Pesola (2007) analyses the individual level employment effects of foreign acquisitions. Foreign 
acquisition is defined by Huttunen and Pesola based on the share of foreign ownership as being over 20 per cent. We 
use data on the actual events of different types of M&As instead.
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savings. The downsizing of overlapping activities almost always involves reductions in the 
workforce.
M&As decrease the number of independent players, which concentrates the market. Salant et al.
(1983) and Perry and Porter (1985) have shown that it does not pay to purchase another firm to 
decrease competition and to gain pricing power in the standard Cournot competition with constant 
returns to scale. When one introduces a non-linear cost function, the tendency to gain from the 
strengthened market power by higher prices will be part of horizontal M&As, and one can expect 
that M&As will reduce the scale of production and labour input, too. 
Shleifer and Summers (1988) have argued that the change in control associated with, especially, 
hostile M&As offers an opportunity for a new management team to renege on implicit and explicit 
labour contracts that constitute obstacles to layoffs. Implicit labour contracts are often used to 
encourage firm-specific investments (e.g. Malcomson 1997). They are binding actions by the old 
owners and the old management team. The new management team that is put in place after an M&A 
is able to renege on implicit labour contracts and to reduce the amount of the workforce. 
The idea that the managers engage in “empire building” has been regarded as one possible 
explanation for M&As (Schumpeter 1934, Marris 1963). The managers also deviate from the 
owner’s interests when they use “free cash” to undertake other firms, as hypothesized by Jensen 
(1986). These motives suggest a negative influence on the purchasing firm’s profits, but regarding 
the impact on employment, the forecast is unclear. 
The effect of M&As on employment may be contingent on the type of M&As. The factors that 
matter are 
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i) the distance between the target and acquiring firm (domestic or foreign in our study), 
ii) the nationality of the acquiring firm (domestic or foreign), and
iii) the institutional nature of an acquirer (another firm or another form of M&A).  
Research on the motives of M&As has suggested that information about the target firm may 
become more incomplete when the distance between the purchasing firm and the target firm 
increases (Lehto). This explains why most purchasers are located close to targets. For instance, in 
the largest and in the most extensive M&As in Finland, the purchaser has always been domestic. 
The better touch of the local markets has enabled profound rationalisation. Accordingly, radical 
structural reforms with considerable negative effects on employment are rather more often 
characterized by domestic M&As and, perhaps, internal restructurings than cross-border M&As. On 
the other hand, one can argue that for foreign owners it may be easier to loosen themselves from 
implicit contracts that preserve employment. For this reason cross-border M&As or domestic 
M&As in which the purchasing firm is foreign-owned may cause greater employment losses than 
other domestic M&As and internal restructurings. 
All in all, the theory does not give a clear prediction about the employment effects. Hence, the net 
employment effect is an empirical matter. The negative effect seems, however, to be the most 
likely. Most authors argue for this view (e.g. Conyon et al. 2002a) and earlier studies have reported 
statistically significant negative effects, especially in Europe (e.g. Gugler and Yurtoglu).
We explore the effect of M&As on employment in three different industry blocks, which are 
a) manufacturing (including utility industries),
b) construction and other services,4 and
                                                          
4 Other services include transport, finance and insurance, real estate, renting and business activities, and personal 
services.
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c) trade (including hotels and restaurants). 
Manufacturing is largely global, from which it follows that foreign firms are as equally present in 
the relevant market as domestic firms. Owing to this, in manufacturing the opportunities to benefit 
from the restriction of competition can be considered scarce in all types of M&As. In the service 
industries a domestic purchaser, being located in the same relevant market as the target firm, may 
have a greater interest than a foreign purchaser to buy another firm to limit competition. This 
especially concerns services such as retail trade, but not banking, finance and insurance, which are 
no less global than manufacturing. Because the service market is sometimes geographically 
restricted and because the joint use of assets may encounter geographical limits (Lehto), we expect 
that in the service sectors rationalisation through asset sharing and the downsizing of employment is 
more typical of domestic M&As than of cross-border M&As. Accordingly, in the service industries 
and in construction, domestic M&As have a larger negative impact on employment than cross-
border M&As. Such a difference is not expected in manufacturing. 
4. Data
Our data on M&As originate from the magazine Talouselämä, which is published on a weekly 
basis. M&As are defined as being based on an ownership share of at least 50%. The magazine 
reports all M&As in which either the acquiring or the acquired firm is a Finnish one, or in which 
either the acquiring or the acquired firm is owned by a Finnish company. The magazine covers all 
sectors. The only restriction is that the magazine Talouselämä does not keep a record of M&As in 
which either the acquirer’s or the target’s turnover is less than FIM 3 million (or around 510 000 
Euros). We exclude a small number of firms that have been targets of M&As two (or more) times 
within a single year to avoid conflating the effects of different types of M&As on employment. We 
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have linked firms that have been subjects of M&As to their establishments. Hence, the analysis is 
done at the establishment level because different establishments that belong to the same firm may 
perform differently.5 In some cases only a certain establishment, not the whole firm, is purchased. 
Different types of M&As that we analyse are cross-border M&As, domestic M&As with 
domestically-owned purchasers, domestic M&As with foreign-owned purchasers, and internal 
restructurings. Their exact definitions are given in Table 1. “Domestic” refers to a firm that is 
domestically located. A domestically located firm can then be either domestically-owned or 
foreign-owned. Hence, “foreign” has a dual meaning: first, it refers to the distance between the 
acquirer and the target firm, and second, it specifies the nationality of an acquirer’s owners from the 
target firm’s viewpoint. We classify internal restructuring into its own category because 
restructuring without the presence of another firm lacks some potential for synergy gains. 
Table 1 around here
The number of establishments that were targets of M&As was 7923 over the period 1989-2003. 
Most of the establishments purchased were part of a domestic M&A, with 5369 such cases. In this 
total, 285 were cases in which a purchaser was a domestic (i.e. located in Finland) but the firm was
foreign-owned. The number of cross-border M&As was 765 (roughly 10% of all M&As). The fact 
that domestic M&As are so much more numerous than cross-border M&As is interesting. It is not 
necessarily, however, typical only of Finland. This phenomenon becomes revealed in our data 
because it registers practically almost all M&As, not only major M&As.
                                                          
5 ”Establishment” refers to the physical location of a certain economic activity. Firms may consist of many 
establishments.
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There is variation in the volume of M&As both across time and across sectors. (To compress the 
presentation in Figs. 1-2 all domestic M&As are added together; i.e. domestic M&As include 
M&As both with a domestically-owned and a foreign-owned purchaser.) The large spike in the 
number of domestic M&As in 1993 stems from the restructuring of the banking sector during the 
great depression (Fig. 1). Domestic M&As were most widely spread in the Finnish Savings Banks 
Group. There has been a substantial increase in the number of cross-border M&As during the latter 
part of the 1990s. Cross-border M&A activity has been most intensive in transport, the wholesale 
trade, and real estate, renting and business activities (Fig. 2). These particular sectors cover around 
60% of all cross-border M&As. The difference in the incidence of cross-border M&As between 
manufacturing and services is interesting because earlier research has typically used data covering 
manufacturing. 
Figures 1-2 around here
Matched data are assembled to obtain establishment-level variables that have a potential influence 
on the likelihood of being a target of an M&A and the evolution of employment after an incidence 
of M&A. (The variables are described in detail in Table 1.) Matching is made possible by the fact 
that the magazine Talouselämä lists the names of the companies that have been involved in M&As. 
Hence, it is possible to link the firm codes with the companies’ names manually. We have used the 
trade register maintained by the National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland and the 
Business Register by Statistics Finland (SF) in this process. In complicated multi-plant M&As the 
additional information from the Business Register has been necessary to identify the parties of an 
M&A at the establishment level. The information about M&As is linked to the Business Register by 
the use of the firm codes. Firms can further be linked to their establishments by the use of registers 
maintained by SF. Employment, obtained from the Business Register, is measured as the average 
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number of employees in the establishment over the year. The matched data are linked to 
Employment Statistics, also maintained by SF, which compiles information on the economic 
activity of individuals and their background characteristics (such as education). Employment 
Statistics contains the plant code on the employee’s employer in the last week of each year. As a 
result, it is possible to link Employment Statistics to other data sources maintained by SF. 
5. Methodology
The features of M&As have implications for modelling. First, the selection of firms for targets is an 
important issue. Foreign companies tend to take over certain Finnish companies with particular 
observable characteristics. The results from Finnish data (Lehto) show that foreign companies tend 
to take over firms whose workers’ education level is high, whose size is large, and who are 
exporters. Second, the adjustment of employment is not immediate, at least not in the 
manufacturing sector. Accordingly, we look at the effects of M&As on employment in time t + 1 
and t + 2. The baseline for the employment level and for change in it is taken from t-1. 
Propensity score matching aims to mimic a random experiment by constructing a control group 
from the group of untreated companies and ensuring that the control group is as similar as possible 
to the treatment group with respect to observable characteristics.6 In our case the treatment is a 
situation in which a firm has been a target of a particular type of M&A. To construct a control 
group for firms that have been targets of M&As over the period 1989-2003, we have included all 
domestic firms from the Business Register by SF that have a turnover of at least FIM 3 million (or 
around 510 000 Euros). This is the very same limit that is used by the magazine Talouselämä when 
it reports M&As. Because we analyse the effects of M&As on employment in t+1 and t+2, we 
                                                          
6 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide a survey of these methods.
Page 13 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
13
require that controls also have to exist in the Business Register in t+1 and t+2. The controls are 
always chosen from the set of firms that have not been targets in any kind of M&A during time 
period t-1, …, t+2. For instance, we exclude those firms that have been subjects of domestic M&As 
when analysing the effects of cross-border M&As on employment. 
Matching is conducted as follows. First, Probit models for being a subject of each type of M&A 
were separately estimated to construct the control group. The propensity scores give predictions for 
the likelihood of becoming a target of a particular type of M&A. Second, the employment level or 
change in it of those that have been a target of an M&A (i.e. the treatment group) was compared 
with the levels of those firms that have a similar propensity (based on the predictions of Probit 
models) to be in the pool of firms taken over by another firm, but are not currently in the pool of 
those firms (i.e. the control group). We use the program by Abadie et al. (2004) to perform exact 
matching on years and industries and the one by Leuven and Sianesi (2006) to conduct propensity 
score matching, kernel matching and the analysis of quality of matching. 
The effect of a particular type of M&A on employment is evaluated based on the average treatment 
effect on the treated. Let Yi(W) be the outcome variable Y of establishment i. In our case the 
outcome variable is employment. W indicates whether establishment i has been a subject of M&As. 
(W is 1 when establishment i has been a subject of a particular type of M&A; otherwise it is 0.) 
Mi(Yj(0)) indicates the average value of the outcome variable Y among the controls j that are 
chosen for the establishment i based on the predictions of Probit models. The average treatment 
effect on the treated that gives a quantitative magnitude for being a subject of a particular type of 
M&A in terms of employment is calculated by using the equation
(1) 


IN
i
Jii
I
YMY
N 0
))]0(()1([
1
Page 14 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
14
where NI is the number of firms that have been targets of a particular type of M&As. Time-variant 
and industry-specific unobservable factors, which have an asymmetric impact on the propensity 
score and on the outcome variable, can cause bias to the average treatment effect on the treated. For 
this reason and because there is a lot of variation in the volume of M&As across years and industries 
(as documented in Figs. 1-2), we used the formula (in the program by Abadie et al.) 
(2) 


IN
i
J
st
ii
stI
YMY
N 0
,, ))]0(()1([
1
,
where t is year and s refers to industry level, in exact matching. Exact matching on years and
industries ensures that the controls for the targets of different types of M&As are selected from the 
same year and from the same industry. 
The main emphasis of our study is on the difference-in-differences estimates. We estimate the 
average treatment effects on the treated for employment changes following Blundell et al. (2004) by 
using the formula 
(3)  

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,
where t0 is a time point before the M&A and t1 is a time point after the M&A. Difference-in-
differences matching removes the fixed firm effects. The validity of the estimator rests on common 
time effects across groups and no systematic composition changes within the treatment and the 
control group.
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6. Results 
We present the results separately for manufacturing, construction and other services, and trade 
(including hotels and restaurants) because earlier evidence is mostly limited to manufacturing. 
(Primary production and electricity, gas and water supply from Fig. 2 are classified under 
manufacturing. “Trade (including hotels and restaurants)” includes the sale and maintenance of 
motor vehicles, retail trade, wholesale trade, and hotels and restaurants from Fig. 2.)
The likelihood of each type of M&A is explained with the Probit models by establishment-level 
variables.7 The values of the explanatory variables (Table 1) are taken from t-1. (Additional 
explanatory variables such as the capital intensity of production could be useful, but they are not 
available in our case.8) The appendix (Table A1), available on the JEBO website, reports the results 
for cross-border M&As because they are most interesting in the context of a small open economy.9
Cross-border M&As are more likely to occur for large establishments. The effect is strongest in 
manufacturing. Exporters are more likely to be involved in cross-border M&As. This effect is 
weakest in construction and other services. A high share of highly educated employees increases the 
likelihood of cross-border M&As. Accordingly, foreign acquirers often target Finnish firms with a 
lot of accumulated knowledge embodied in human capital. The education structure plays a much 
smaller role in the determination of domestic M&As (both types) compared with cross-border 
M&As. Older firms are more likely to be subjects of internal restructurings.
                                                          
7 In the calculation of standard errors for firm’s age and whether it is an exporter or not, we have taken into account the 
fact that observations are clustered by firms because, otherwise, standard errors for them would be biased downwards.
8 In matching one need not control for all the observable factors at the same time, but it suffices to condition on the 
propensity score (i.e. the probability of treatment).
9 The earlier results regarding these effects are reported in detail in Lehto and Lehtoranta (2004) and Lehto (2006).
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The matching results are reported as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), with 
employment changes based on the difference-in-differences estimator. The difference-in-differences 
matching gives reliable results of the effects of M&As on the employment change even when 
M&As that occur in time t have an effect on the employment level in t-1.10 The number of different 
types of M&As is somewhat smaller with the use of matching models than in Figs. 1-2 because we 
require that the establishments considered exist during the whole period from t-1 to t+2. In addition, 
explaining the employment change in t+2 means that we lose three years of data (1989, 2002 and 
2003). This reduces, in particular, the number of cross-border M&As owing to the surge of cross-
border M&As that occurred towards the end of our observation period. The number of M&As is 
also reduced with the use of matching models owing to non-availability of the control variables for 
some establishments from the registers of SF.
We report three sets of results for ATTs  (Table 2). The first set is based on exact matching on years 
and industries with the nearest-neighbour matching method.11 The matching on variables other than 
years and industries is based on propensity scores. These results constitute our preferred estimate 
because the number of M&As varies a lot between years and industries (Figs. 1-2), and exact 
matching on years and industries scales down the amount of bias associated with time-variant and 
industry-specific unobservable factors. When using the nearest-neighbour matching method one 
treated unit is always matched to five untreated units. The second set is based on propensity score 
matching with the nearest-neighbour matching method using the region of common support for the 
                                                          
10 Employment is measured as the average number of employees in the establishment over the year (Table 1). For this 
reason, we do not expect that M&As have large effects on the employment level at time t. In general, this is the case. 
The results for the employment level are reported in a working paper.
11 We use the solely linear part of the prediction (Diamond and Sekhon 2005) when conducting exact matching on years 
and industries because the compression of the probability mass around the value of 0 and 1 could cause problems for 
matching.
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scores.12 In general, we do not lose observations by imposing the common support condition 
because the estimation of Probit models before matching typically deletes the outliers that are 
outside the common support.13 To check the validity of the matching, covariate balancing is tested. 
For all the variables the matching succeeds in making the means of the covariates close to each 
other for the treated and controls at the standard 5% level (Appendix A2).14 The third set of the 
results is based on the kernel method (Epanechenikov kernel). To illustrate the economic 
significance of the effects, the absolute number of employees in the target companies is reported 
(Appendix A3).
Table 2 around here
Based on exact matching on years and industries, cross-border M&As cause significant 
employment losses in manufacturing. This is largely in line with the findings of earlier studies 
(discussed in Section 2) that have mostly used data solely covering manufacturing, but in contrast 
with the results reported by Bellak et al. for Austrian manufacturing firms. The magnitude of the 
negative effect increases over time, being around 20% at time t+2. Employment decline of the 
magnitude of 20% means that the absolute number of employees in the average plant declines by 23 
(=0.20115) persons at time t+2.15 For non-manufacturing there is little evidence of negative 
                                                          
12 We follow the definition of common support in the Leuven-Sienesi program, where this is defined to include all 
controls and those treated whose propensity score is below the maximum or above the minimum propensity score of 
the controls.
13 In manufacturing for domestic M&As (with a foreign-owned acquirer) we lose four treated when imposing the 
common support condition. In addition, in manufacturing for domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer), 
we lose one treated.
14 Indicators for a firm’s legal form, year dummies, industry dummies, and regional dummies are not reported in 
Appendix A2. The matching succeeds in making the means of the covariates close to each other for the treated and 
controls for these variables also. 
15 Because the size distribution of the targets in terms of employment is skewed, the maximum effect (225=0.201128) 
in manufacturing for cross-border M&As is much larger than the average effect (Appendix A3). For an estimate for the 
Finnish economy, the fact that the number of cross-border M&As in manufacturing has been 136 over the period has to 
be taken into account. Many of the plants in manufacturing are located in Eastern and Northern Finland, where the 
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employment effects, but for construction and other services, the results point to a negative 
employment change at time t+2. (For trade, including hotels and restaurants, there is some 
indication of employment gains at the 10% significance level at time t+1.) However, these effects 
almost vanish if we abandon the “exact matching” requirement. The results from propensity score 
matching and kernel matching (both without exact matching on years and industries) reveal the 
same underlying pattern, especially for manufacturing. 
The employment effects of domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer) are substantially 
different from the ones that emerged for cross-border M&As. There are substantial negative (and 
statistically significant) employment effects for all sectors.16 This is consistent with our hypothesis 
that in the service industries a domestic purchaser, being located in the same relevant market as the 
target firm, may have a greater interest than a foreign one to buy another firm to limit competition. 
Because the service market is sometimes geographically restricted and because the joint use of 
assets (including human capital) may encounter geographical limits, we expected that in the service 
sectors the rationalisation through asset-sharing and the related downsizing of employment would 
be more typical of domestic M&As than of cross-border M&As. Accordingly, cross-border M&As 
have a larger negative effect on employment than domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned 
purchaser) in the manufacturing sector. The negative employment effects of domestic M&As (with 
a domestically-owned acquirer) are strongest for construction and other services. The effects are 
smaller for labour-intensive services (trade, hotels and restaurants) than for manufacturing, because 
in labour-intensive services there are fewer overall opportunities to downsize workforce.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
small size of the local labour markets makes even the average effects regionally important. The effects are smaller for 
non-manufacturing. 
16 We have studied the robustness of the results by dropping the financial sector from construction and other services 
because restructuring in the financial sector covered a large part of domestic M&As in the services in the early 1990s. 
The basic findings remain the same. In particular, when the financial sector is dropped from construction and other 
services for domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer), the results point to a negative employment change 
of –0.089 (with t-value of –2.85) and –0.107 (with t-value of –2.87), at time t+1 and t+2, respectively. The effect of the 
financial sector on the results for other types of M&As is even smaller.
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The quantitative magnitude of employment losses from domestic M&As (with a domestically-
owned purchaser) is quite similar to that reported by Gugler and Yurtoglu, according to which 
M&As in Europe reduce the demand for labour by about 10% on average. For instance, negative 
employment change is around 9% in an establishment in construction and other services at time t+1. 
The results for domestic M&As (with a domestically-owned acquirer) differ somewhat between 
different matching methods. Employment losses are typically largest when kernel matching is used. 
The results of domestic M&As (with a foreign-owned acquirer) are based on a very small number 
of M&As. There are large negative employment effects in construction and other services, but in 
trade (hotels and restaurants) the effects are not statistically significant. The results from propensity 
score matching and kernel matching are similar in this respect. Internal restructurings hurt 
employment, too. Their effect is strongest in trade (including hotels and restaurants). There are 
some positive employment effects in construction and other services when exact matching on years 
and industries is used, but the effects disappear in propensity score matching and kernel matching. 
All in all, our results show that it is not solely cross-border M&As that have statistically significant, 
negative effects on employment. 
7. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the employment effects of M&As on targets by 
using matched establishment-level data from Finland over the period 1989-2003. In this paper, we 
focus not only on cross-border or domestic M&As, but we also analyse the employment effects of 
several different types of M&As. We classify M&As being either cross-border M&A (in which the 
purchaser is a foreign company that is located abroad), domestic M&A with a domestically-owned 
purchaser, domestic M&A with a foreign-owned company that is located in Finland, or internal 
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restructuring in which the purchaser is not another company. Hence, “foreign” has a dual meaning: 
first, it refers to the distance between the acquirer and the target firm, and second, it specifies the 
nationality of an acquirer’s owners from the target firm’s viewpoint. Our data register practically 
almost all M&As in all sectors.
We discover that cross-border M&As lead to downsizing in manufacturing employment. The 
effects of cross-border M&As on employment in non-manufacturing are much weaker. The 
separation of foreign acquirers by home countries would be an interesting topic for further research 
because it is possible that the employment effects vary according to the distance between the target 
and acquiring firm. Regarding the policy implications of our results for cross-border M&As, it is 
important to note that, at least within the EU, capital flows are restricted by competition law only. 
Accordingly, the scope for policy actions to preserve domestic manufacturing employment is 
limited. Domestic M&As with a domestic purchaser, on the other hand, have negative employment 
effects for all sectors. The effect of domestic M&As with foreign-owned purchasers on employment 
is remarkably negative in construction and other services. Internal restructurings that do not involve 
another company also tend to cause employment losses. 
To sum up, the most important finding is that almost all changes in ownership lead to employment 
losses. That cross-border M&As have a negative impact only in manufacturing and that domestic 
M&As with foreign-owned purchasers have, however, a substantial negative impact on employment 
in construction and other services may emerge from the situation in which foreign interference in 
service industries develops in two stages: first, by establishing a bridgehead through a cross-border 
M&A, and after this, strengthening the dominance of the market through domestic M&As. The 
deep-going rationalisation of activities is typical only of the latter stage because deeper knowledge 
of the market has developed for a foreign player.
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Our reading of the evidence is that the focus of the earlier research primarily on manufacturing (and 
listed companies) can deliver a seriously distorted picture of the adjustment of employment that 
takes place in broader industries. In particular, the negative effects of cross-border M&As on 
employment are almost non-existent in non-manufacturing. Furthermore, the negative effects of 
M&As on employment do not arise exclusively from cross-border M&As. The evidence therefore 
points out that cross-border M&As seem to be less specific regarding their effects on employment 
than has previously been thought. A prominent explanation for employment losses is that the 
change in control through M&As offers an opportunity for a new management team to renege on 
implicit labour contracts that have constituted obstacles for layoffs (Shleifer and Summers). Our 
results call for more studies that incorporate information from non-manufacturing sectors.
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 Table 1. Description of the variables
Variables Definition/measurement 
Types of M&As:
Cross-border M&A Cross-border M&As are defined as cases where the 
acquiring firm is foreign. “Foreign” here means that 
the firm, which is reported by the magazine 
Talouselämä to be the acquirer, is not located in 
Finland at the time of the M&A. (Source: the 
magazine Talouselämä) 
Domestic M&A (Domestic owner, located in 
Finland)
We separate two types of domestic M&As based on 
ownership. (These types are added together in Figs. 
1-2. First, there are domestic M&As, where the 
acquirer is domestically-owned and located in 
Finland.) (Source: the magazine Talouselämä)
Domestic M&A (Foreign owner, located in 
Finland)
Second, there are domestic M&As, where the 
acquirer is foreign-owned, but located in Finland. 
(Hence, cross-border M&As are defined as cases 
where transaction truly occurs across national 
borders.) (Source: the magazine Talouselämä) 
Internal restructuring Internal restructurings involve cases of 
transformation of a firm’s organizational form 
without the involvement of another company. For 
instance, management buy-outs that have been 
popular through the 1990s and a smaller number of 
cases where an individual Finnish investor is buying 
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the firm belong to this category of M&As. (Source: 
the magazine Talouselämä)
Establishment-level features: 
Employment A logarithm of the average number of employed 
persons in the establishment during the year. 
(Source: Business Register by SF)
The size of establishment A logarithm of the number of employed persons. 
(Source: Business Register by SF)
The number of establishments The number of establishments. (Source: Business 
Register by SF)
Firm’s age The age of a firm is measured in years. The base 
year is not dependent on firm’s legal status. (Source: 
Business Register by SF) 
Exporter Firm is involved in export activity = 1, otherwise 0.  
(Source: Business Register by SF)
Share of highly educated (technical) The share of highly educated employees with 
technical qualifications of the total number of 
employees in an establishment. (Source: 
Employment Statistics by SF)
Share of highly educated (other degrees) The share of highly educated employees (excluding 
the number of highly educated employees with 
technical qualifications) of the total number of 
employees in an establishment. (Source: 
Employment Statistics by SF)
Share of employees with intermediate degrees The share of employees with middle education in an 
establishment. Reference group for the education 
structure is made of those with comprehensive 
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education only. (Source: Employment Statistics by 
SF)
The total number of establishments in the 
industry
The total number of establishments in the industry 
(21 subgroups) and in the same NUTS4 region. 
The number of targets in the industry The number of other establishments in the industry 
(21 subgroups) and in the same NUTS4 region that 
have been a target in any kind of M&A over the 
period 1989-2003. 
Indicators:
Firm’s legal form Legal form of firm consists of the following 
categories: corporation, general partnership, co-
operative society and trader. (Source: Business 
Register by SF)  
Years 15-1 (The temporal variation of different types of 
M&As is shown in Fig. 1.) 
Regions 85 regional dummies based on NUTS 4 regions 
stipulated by the European Union.
Industries 21 industry dummies (Source: Business Register by 
SF). (The sectoral variation of different types of 
M&As is documented in Fig. 2.) 
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Fig. 1. The number of different types of M&As over the period 1989-2003. (Two types of domestic 
M&As are added together.) 
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Fig. 2. The sectoral division of different types of M&As. (The figures are reported as sums over the 
period 1989-2003 and two types of domestic M&As are added together.)
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Table 2. The effect of M&As on the number of employees in the establishment.
Exact 
matching 
Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As (with domestically-owned 
purchasers)
Domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) Internal restructurings
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Employment, t 
– (t-1)
ATT -0.112** -0.006 -0.020 -0.039** -0.041** -0.045** -0.045 -0.050 -0.032 -0.047** 0.106** -0.068**
t-value -2.51 -0.14 -0.66 -2.68 -2.59 -3.42 -0.84 -0.78 -0.37 -2.10 2.03 -3.20
Employment, 
(t+1) – (t-1)
ATT -0.176** -0.051 0.074* -0.085** -0.092** -0.059** 0.048 -0.320** -0.123 -0.059* 0.101* -0.078**
t-value -2.97 -0.81 1.79 -3.71 -3.93 -3.02 0.42 -2.47 -1.01 -1.88 1.69 -2.61
Employment, 
(t+2) – (t-1)
ATT -0.220** -0.164** -0.000 -0.089** -0.103** -0.045* -0.083 -0.297** -0.191 -0.054 0.032 -0.148**
t-value -3.21 -2.11 -0.01 -3.05 -3.67 -1.98 -0.66 -2.20 -1.49 -1.37 0.35 -3.84
Propensity 
score 
matching 
Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As (with domestically-owned 
purchasers)
Domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) Internal restructurings
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Employment, 
T – (t-1)
ATT -0.112* 0.005 -0.043 -0.040** -0.034 -0.056** -0.077 -0.087 -0.063 -0.060* 0.000 -0.077**
t-value -1.80 0.01 -0.77 -2.11 -1.55 -3.50 -0.72 -0.91 -0.51 -1.62 0.00 -2.06
Employment, 
(t+1) – (t-1)
ATT -0.177* -0.020 0.038 -0.099** -0.081** -0.079** -0.028 -0.375 -0.163 -0.059 -0.017 -0.088**
t-value -1.92 -0.20 0.50 -2.63 -2.12 -3.09 -0.17 -1.71* -0.93 -1.26 -0.23 -2.13
Employment, 
(t+2) – (t-1)
ATT -0.217** -0.157 -0.021 -0.112** -0.093* -0.062* -0.137 -0.353* -0.255 -0.067 -0.093 -0.155**
t-value -2.01 -1.12 -0.27 -2.69 -1.95 -1.96 -0.77 -1.67 -1.24 -1.01 -0.97 -2.52
Kernel 
matching
Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As (with domestically-owned 
purchasers)
Domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) Internal restructurings
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Employment, 
T – (t-1)
ATT -0.138** -0.058 -0.091* -0.058** -0.047* -0.076** -0.116 -0.115 -0.109 -0.108** 0.003 -0.106**
t-value -2.11 -0.79 -1.86 -2.44 -1.99 -4.12 -1.26 -1.23 -0.85 -3.41 0.05 -3.04
Employment, 
(t+1) – (t-1)
ATT -0.208** -0.107 -0.036 -0.130** -0.111** -0.111** -0.075 -0.413** -0.228 -0.144** -0.003 -0.144**
t-value -2.42 -1.06 -0.55 -4.06 -3.04 -4.95 -0.47 -2.13 -1.26 -3.12 -0.04 -2.80
Employment, 
(t+2) – (t-1)
ATT -0.244* -0.256* -0.094 -0.161** -0.141** -0.102** -0.205 -0.391* -0.312 -0.179** -0.112 -0.203**
t-value -1.96 -1.90 -1.30 -3.87 -3.41 -4.97 -0.97 -1.81 -1.52 -3.05 -1.34 -3.25
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The number of 
M&As
59 97 122 428 633 789 35 51 23 226 303 218
The number of 
potential 
controls 
67 334 118 698 111 476 90 466 186 524 227 186 29 366 125 052 44 750 81 136 157 777 192 405
Note: Exact matching is conducted on years and industries with the nearest-neighbour matching method (matching on other variables than years and industries is based on 
propensity scores) using the program by Abadie et al. (2004), and propensity score matching with the nearest-neighbour matching method and kernel matching using the 
program by Leuven and Sianesi (2006). Robust t statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. Robust t statistics in propensity score matching and kernel 
matching are calculated by bootstrapping (150 replications). The number of controls in the nearest-neighbour matching method is five in each case. ATT refers to average 
treatment effect on the treated.
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Appendix A1. Probit estimates for cross-border M&As.
Manufacturing Construction and 
other services
Trade (hotels 
and restaurants)
The size of establishment (t-1) 0.186*** (5.68) 0.165*** (6.56) 0.079** (2.51)
The number of establishments (t-1) 0.003** (2.39) 0.000** (-0.76) -0.001** (-2.86)
Firm’s age (t-1) -0.001 (-0.56) 0.005** (3.15) -0.003** (-2.05)
Exporter (t-1) 0.385** (2.89) 0.332* (1.80) 0.930*** (10.49)
Share of highly educated (technical) (t-1) 1.408** (2.19) 0.453 (1.15) 1.741** (2.38)
Share of highly educated (other degrees) (t-1) -0.027 (-0.04) 0.593** (3.17) 0.826** (2.62)
Share of employees with intermediate degrees (t-1) 0.177 (0.55) 0.170 (0.98) 0.278** (2.19)
The total number of establishments in the industry (t-1) 0.088 (1.44) 0.018 (0.38) 0.015 (0.32)
The number of targets in the industry (t-1) -0.012* (-1.94) -0.006** (-2.25) -0.003* (-1.67)
Indicators:
Firm’s legal form Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes
Regions Yes Yes Yes
Industries Yes Yes Yes
The number of observations 67 393 118 795 111 598
Note: Robust z statistics are reported; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Appendix A2. Test of covariate balancing (% reduction of bias and t-test for the difference of means between the treated and the control group 
after matching in parentheses).
Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As (with domestically-owned 
purchasers)
Domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) Internal restructurings
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
The size of establishment 93.4 (-0.43) 98.8 (0.06) 55.1 (-0.70) 97.5 (-0.23) 93.5 (-0.30) 74.1 (-1.93)* 22.4 (0.86) 84.7 (0.36) 75.7 (-0.36) 96.5 (-0.28) 90.1 (-0.93) 91.6 (-0.38)
The number of establishments 71.3 (0.60) 94.5 (0.19) 92.2 (0.13) 99.7 (0.01) 97.6 (0.04) 99.5 (-0.02) 92.3 (0.26) 99.7 (0.09) 95.7 (-0.07) 82.3 (0.80) 86.0 (1.21) 97.0 (0.14)
Firm’s age 19.9 (0.24) 81.2 (0.50) -1114.1 (-1.04) 94.6 (0.30) 54.9 (-1.85)* 97.5 (-0.46) -47.2 (-1.11) 79.4 (-0.45) 97.5 (-0.07) 90.1 (-0.43) 77.8 (-1.29) 90.2 (-0.54)
Exporter 99.2 (-0.06) 61.3 (0.73) 84.7 (-0.59) 99.3 (-0.04) 83.0 (-0.19) 70.5 (0.91) 97.3 (0.07) 31.1 (-0.13) 88.7 (-0.24) 93.1 (-0.56) 81.1 (-1.54) 98.1 (0.11)
Share of highly educated 
(technical) 
81.5 (0.24) 95.5 (-0.06) 3.0 (0.17) 81.7 (-0.27) -34.4 (0.33) 12.1 (-0.08) 99.8 (-0.00) 96.4 (-0.02) .. 41.1 (0.73) -29.6 (-0.40) 41.3 (0.11)
Share of highly educated 
(other degrees) 
66.1 (0.25) 86.2 (-0.33) 36.6 (-0.28) 66.8 (-0.12) 87.8 (-0.22) 97.3 (-0.19) -40.2 (-0.15) 86.7 (0.19) -18.6 (-0.26) 39.0 (0.84) 49.3 (0.63) 79.9 (0.07)
Share of employees with 
intermediate degrees 
-69.6 (0.08) 86.1 (-0.17) 70.8 (0.24) 94.7 (-0.11) 57.9 (0.96) 97.6 (0.10) 72.7 (0.13) 65.3 (-0.22) 88.0 (-0.09) 97.4 (-0.10) 87.5 (-0.77) -22.5 (0.52)
The total number of 
establishments in the industry
-18.7 (-0.58) 77.8 (-0.84) 70.1 (-0.49) 66.8 (-0.12) 83.4 (0.61) 82.8 (-0.97) 94.2 (-0.20) 90.8 (0.16) -266.3 (-0.48) -20.5 (-0.57) 93.1 (-0.60) 99.4 (-0.01)
The number of targets in the 
industry 
91.3 (-0.23) 89.2 (-0.37) 79.1 (-0.37) 72.5 (0.66) 43.6 (-0.68) 51.1 (-1.19) 86.8. (0.30) 87.9 (-0.16) -62.1 (-0.48) 97.9 (-0.08) 84.9 (-1.26) 79.1 (-0.16)
Note: Computations are based on the program by Leuven and Sianesi. Indicators for firm’s legal form, year dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies are not reported. 
Significance: ** 5 %, * 10 %. For domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) in trade (including hotels and restaurants), the share of highly educated (technical) has been zero 
in all targets. 
Appendix A3. Number of employees in the targets of M&As.
Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As (with domestically-owned 
purchasers)
Domestic M&As (with foreign-owned purchasers) Internal restructurings
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Manufacturing Construction 
and other 
services
Trade (hotels 
and 
restaurants)
Average employment over the 
years (maximum value)
 115.4 (1128) 36.8 (389) 13.1 (210) 84.7 (3449) 17.7 (650) 10.6 (235) 23.9 (240) 19.6 (291) 11.2 (291) 91.8 (2475) 40.3 (4495) 40.3 (4495)
